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巴菲特致股东信-1975年

 笔记:

  • 华盛顿邮报已成为伯克希尔第一重仓股

翻译:

  • 雪球:https://xueqiu.com/6217262310/131409324
  • 备份:https://archive.ph/4hgK3

原文:

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Last year, when discussing the prospects for 1975, we stated “the outlook for 1975 is not encouraging.” This forecast proved to be distressingly accurate. Our operating earnings for 1975 were $6,713,592, or $6.85 per share, producing a return on beginning shareholders ’ equity of 7.6%. This is the lowest return on equity experienced since 1967. Furthermore, as explained later in this letter, a large segment of these earnings resulted from Federal income tax refunds which will not be available to assist performance in 1976.

On balance, however, current trends indicate a somewhat brighter 1976. Operations and prospects will be discussed in greater detail below, under specific industry titles. Our expectation is that significantly better results in textiles, earnings added from recent acquisitions, an increase in equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps resulting from an enlarged ownership interest, and at least a moderate improvement in insurance underwriting results will more than offset other possible negatives to produce greater earnings in 1976. The major variable—and by far the most difficult to predict with any feeling of confidence—is the insurance underwriting result. Present very tentative indications are that underwriting improvement is in prospect. If such improvement is moderate, our overall gain in earnings in 1976 likewise will prove moderate. More significant underwriting improvement could give us a major gain in earnings.

Textile Operations

During the first half of 1975 sales of textile products were extremely depressed, resulting in major production curtailments. Operations ran at a significant loss, with employment down as much as 53% from a year earlier.

In contrast with previous cyclical slumps, however, most textile producers quickly reduced production to match incoming orders, thus preventing massive industry-wide accumulation of inventories. Such cutbacks caused quite prompt reflection at the mill operating level when demand revived at retail. As a result, beginning about midyear business rebounded at a fairly rapid rate. This “V” shaped textile depression, while one of the sharpest on record, also became one of the shortest ones in our experience. The fourth quarter produced an excellent profit for our textile division, bringing results for the year into the black.

On April 28, 1975 we acquired Waumbec Mills Incorporated and Waumbec Dyeing and Finishing Co., Inc. located in Manchester, New Hampshire. These companies have long sold woven goods into the drapery and apparel trade. Such drapery materials complement and extend the line already marketed through the Home Fabrics Division of Berkshire Hathaway. In the period prior to our acquisition, the company had run at a very substantial loss, with only about 55% of looms in operation and the finishing plant operating at about 50% of capacity. Losses continued on a reduced basis for a few months after acquisition. Outstanding efforts by our manufacturing, administrative and sales people now have produced major improvements, which, coupled with the

general revival in textiles, have moved Waumbecinto a significant profit position.

We expect a good level of profits from textiles in 1976. Continued progress is being made in the movement of Waumbec goods into areas of traditional marketing strength of Berkshire Hathaway, productivity should improve in both the weaving and finishing areas at Manchester, and textile demand continues to firm at decent prices.

We have great confidence in the ability of Ken Chace and his team to maximize our strengths in textiles. Therefore, we continue to look for ways to increase further our scale of operations while avoiding major capital investment in new fixed assets which we consider unwise, considering the relatively low returns historically earned on large scale investment in new textile equipment.

Insurance Underwriting

The property and casualty insurance industry had its worst year in history during 1975. Wedid our share—unfortunately, even somewhat more. Really disastrous results were concentrated in auto and long-tail (contracts where settlement of loss usually occurs long after the loss event) lines.

Economic inflation, with the increase in cost of repairing humans and property far outstripping the general rate of inflation, produced ultimate loss costs which soared beyond premium levels established in a different cost environment. “Social” inflation caused the liability concept to be expanded continuously, far beyond limits contemplated when rates were established—in effect, adding coverage beyond what was paid for. Such social inflation increased significantly both the propensity to sue and the possibility of collecting mammoth jury awards for events not previously considered statistically significant in the establishment of rates. Furthermore, losses to policyholders which otherwise would result from mushrooming insolvencies of companies inadequately reacting to these problems are divided through Guaranty Funds among remaining solvent insurers. These trends will continue, and should moderate any optimism which otherwise might be justified by the sharply increased rates now taking effect.

Berkshire Hathaway’s insurance subsidiaries have a disproportionate concentration of business in precisely the lines which produced the worst underwriting results in 1975. Such lines produce unusually high investment income and, therefore, have been particularly attractive to us under previous underwriting conditions. However, our “mix” has been very disadvantageous during the past two years and it well may be that we will remain positioned in the more difficult part of the insurance spectrum during the inflationary years ahead.

The only segment to show improved results for us during 1975 was the “home state” operation, which has made continuous progress under the leadership of John Ringwalt. Although still operating at a significant underwriting loss, the combined ratio improved from 1974. Adjusted for excess costs attributable to operations still in the start-up phase, underwriting results are satisfactory. Texas United Insurance Company, a major problem a few years ago, has made outstanding progress since George Billing has assumed command. With an almost totally new agency force, Texas United was the winner of the “Chairman’s Cup” for achievement of the

lowest loss ratio among the home state companies. Cornhusker Casualty Company, oldest and largest of the home state companies, continues its outstanding operation with major gains in premium volume and a combined ratio slightly under 100. Substantial premium growth is expected at the home state operation during 1976; the measurement of success, however, will continue to be the achievement of a low combined ratio.

Our traditional business at National Indemnity Company, representing well over half of our insurance volume, had an extraordinarily bad underwriting year in 1975. Although rates were increased frequently and significantly, they continually lagged loss experience throughout the year. Several special programs instituted in the early 1970s have caused significant losses, as well as a heavy drain on managerial time and energies. Present indications are that premium volume will show a major increase in 1976, and we hope that underwriting results will improve.

Reinsurance suffered the same problems as our direct business during 1975. The same remedial efforts were attempted. Because reinsurance contract settlements lag those of direct business, it well may be that any upturn in results from our direct insurance business will precede those of the reinsurance segment.

At our Home and Automobile Insurance Company subsidiary, now writing auto business only in the Cook County area of Illinois, experience continued very bad in 1975 resulting in a management change in October. John Seward was made President at that time, and has energetically and imaginatively implemented a completely revamped underwriting approach. Overall, our insurance operation will produce a substantial gain in premium volume during 1976. Much of this will reflect increased rates rather than more policies. Under normal circumstances such a gain in volume would be welcome, but our emotions are mixed at present. Underwriting experience should improve—and we expect it to—but our confidence level is not high. While our efforts will be devoted to obtaining a combined ratio below 100, it is unlikely to be attained during 1976.

Insurance Investments

Gains in investment income were moderate during 1975 because premium volume remained flat and underwriting losses reduced funds available for investment. Invested assets, measured at cost at yearend, were close to identical with the level at the beginning of the year.

At the end of 1974 the net unrealized loss in the stock section of our portfolio amounted to about $17 million, but we expressed the opinion, nevertheless, that this portfolio overall represented good value at its carrying value of cost. During 1975 a net capital loss of $2,888,000 before tax credits was realized, but our present expectation is that 1976 will be a year of realized capital gain. On March 31, 1976 our net unrealized gains applicable to equities amounted to about $15 million. Our equity investments are heavily concentrated in a few companies which are selected based on favorable economic characteristics, competent and honest management, and a purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner.

When such criteria are maintained, our intention is to hold for a long time; indeed, our largest equity investment is 467,150 shares of Washington Post “B” stock with a cost of $10.6 million, which we expect to hold permanently.

With this approach, stock market fluctuations are of little importance to us—except as they may provide buying opportunities—but business performance is of major importance. On this score we have been delighted with progress made by practically all of the companies in which we now have significant investments.

We have continued to maintain a strong liquid position in our insurance companies. In last year’s annual report we explained how variations of 1/10 of 1% in interest rates result in million dollar swings in market value of our bonds. Weconsider such market fluctuation of minor importance as our liquidity and general financial strength make it highly improbable that bonds will have to be sold at times other than those of our choice.

Banking

It is difficult to find adjectives to describe the performance of Eugene Abegg, Chief Executive of Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford, Illinois, our banking subsidiary.

In a year when many banking operations experienced major troubles, Illinois National continued its outstanding record. Against average loans of about $65 million, net loan losses were $24,000, or .04%. Unusually high liquidity is maintained with obligations of the U. S. Government and its agencies, all due within one year, at yearend amounting to about 75% of demand deposits.

Maximum rates of interest are paid on all consumer savings instruments which make up more than $2 million, it consistently has generated favorable earnings. Positioned as we now are with respect to income taxes, the addition of a solid source of taxable income is particularly welcome.

General Review

Yourpresent management assumed responsibility at Berkshire Hathaway in May, 1965. At the end of the prior fiscal year (September, 1964) the net worth of the Company was $22.1 million, and 1,137,778 common shares were outstanding, with a resulting book value of $19.46 per share. Ten years earlier, Berkshire Hathaway’s net worth had been $53.4 million. Dividends and stock repurchases accounted for over $21 million of the decline in company net worth, but aggregate net losses of $9.8 million had been incurred on sales of $595 million during the decade.

In 1965, two New England textile mills were the company’s only sources of earning power and, before Ken Chace assumed responsibility for the operation, textile earnings had been erratic and, cumulatively, something less than zero subsequent to the merger of Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing. Since 1964, net worth has been built to $92.9 million, or $94.92 per share. We have acquired total, or virtually total ownership of six businesses through negotiated purchases for cash (or cash and notes) from private owners, started four others, purchased a 31.5%

interest in a large affiliate enterprise and reduced the number of outstanding shares of Berkshire Hathaway to 979,569. Overall, equity per share has compounded at an annual rate of slightly over 15%.

While 1975 was a major disappointment, efforts will continue to develop growing and diversified sources of earnings. Our objective is a conservatively financed and highly liquid business—possessing extra margins of balance sheet strength consistent with the fiduciary obligations inherent in the banking and insurance industries—which will produce a long term rate of return on equity capital exceeding that of American industry as a whole.

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman


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  书房拾遗-第42至45期 42期 网络说:持有平安的人,大概率持有万科,而持有平安和万科的人,大概率也持有格力。 后来想通了,这类投资者,内心基本是将“龙头+白马+低市盈率+从股价高点已经大幅调整”这几个条件叠加,然后将其等同于正宗的“价值投资”,所以自然而然地汇总到同一条路上了。 网友:uta:老唐,请问企业价值为什么用现金流折现,而不是用净利润折现? 唐朝:因为净利润不是钱,净利润是账。账不是价值,钱才是价值。 地魔:请问在你的投资体系里,一家公司的ROE低于多少就不值得研究或者投资了? 唐朝:通常低于8%我就不大关注了。 43期 唐朝:银行非常常见的操作。放贷款的同时拉存款,降低了实际贷款额,提高了真实贷款利率。 WDS:没看懂,怎么提高贷款利率? 唐朝 :你获得银行贷款100万,利率5%。但同时要求你存款30万,存款利息2%,你实际贷款多少,成本多少? 唐朝:你一年支付5万利息,收到0.6万利息,实际使用资金70万,所以,你的贷款利率是4.4/70=6.29%。说这个是小学数学,不算夸张吧? 44期 Uta:是不是投资港股市场的股票风险要比A股的股票大? 唐朝:核心在于自己的理念。理念不对,A股港股都是风大浪大;理念对了,港股A股都是闲庭信步。 唐朝:主要是招股书披露的基础知识特别详细,一般我会看看,学习一些行业基础知识。和普通年报一样,没啥特别要注意的地方。 45期 数字货币替代的是现金,微信支付宝可以作为现金支付手段,也可以作为数字货币支付手段。货币的形式和支付的形式,是两码事。 数字货币不是微信支付宝的对手,它是运钞车、ATM机、点钞员、印刷厂……的对手。 Lei:老唐,对于初学者来说的话是先多看财报,还是先多看书籍比较好。谢谢 唐朝:我认为多看财报,不懂的时候查书,是进步最快的方式。 老唐从2017年1月首次介入腾讯至今,只有买入没有卖出,最低买过197.3港币,最高买过607港币,平均买入位置大概在465~470港币之间(就是去年底约480港币的平均买入位置减去所分京东股票价值),目前持有腾讯的市值是八位数,亏损是七位数。 但不装不端,我真没有任何压力。如前所述,真要是爆发核战争,拿股票现金黄金房子都是一码事,没区别;如果没有核战争,等上几年后我几乎100%确定我会是赚钱的,区别无外乎也就是赚几千万还是赚几百万而已。

[海外建筑生活] MIT建筑系

原文链接: [海外建筑生活] MIT建筑系 发表于:寄托天下 2009-1-18 作者:dadazhe 前些日子和版大聊天,他让我写点关于mit的情况. 趁着寒假的尾巴,随便介绍点. mit的建筑系分为marchI marchII 和Smarch, 分别是三年半,两年半和两年. 前两这都是naab认证的,也就是说毕业以后可以考注册建筑师. smarch比较特殊,分为五个方向,你必须选择一个,分别是 urbanism, computation, theory&history, building technology, visual arts.

微软收购暴雪来给腾讯游戏业务做个估值

  微软收购暴雪来给腾讯游戏业务做个估值 1月18日,微软宣布将以每股95美元的价格收购动视暴雪,全现金交易,总价值687亿美元。预计将在2023财年完成交易。 这个信息出来后,书房老朋友@李强 利用这个收购做了个估值对比,思路挺清晰的。我修正了几个数字分享给大家,谢谢李强 李强:其实倒是可以借助微软收购暴雪来给腾讯游戏业务做个估值。 2020年,腾讯总收入4820亿,非国际准则口径净利润1227亿。非国际准则口径净利率=1227/4820=25.45%。 2020年,腾讯游戏收入1921亿。由于已知游戏的毛利率和净利率,远高于广告业务和金融科技及企业服务。 所以我们可以推测,游戏业务的净利润最保守的估计也应该不低于1921×25.45%=489亿。 按照2020年美元平均汇率6.89折算,相当于489/6.89=71亿美金。 暴雪2020年净利润是22亿美金,微软出全现金687亿美元收购。 按照这个比率,腾讯游戏业务的价值至少不低于71/22×687亿≈2200亿美元,约1.4万亿人民币(按照目前6.35汇率折算)。 按照目前腾讯约455港币的价格(指1月19日上午),总市值不超过3.6万亿人民币。 3.6万亿里,减去腾讯持有的约1.5万亿股权投资(三季报数据:市值1.08万亿的联合营股权,约4500亿笋子和粽子),再减去游戏业务市值1.4万亿。 这意味着除了游戏和投资之外,腾讯的广告、视频、音乐、文学、金融科技、企业服务等其他板块,合并起来的总估值3.6-1.5-1.4=0.7万亿。 而 这些业务2020年的净利润是1227-489=738亿,不足10倍市盈率,属于明显低估。 即使将有息负债约3500亿算上(借款、应付票据、其他金融负债),对应也就约14倍市盈率,依然属于明显低估。   这大概就是不管怎么算,都能看见的“低估”吧!